Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.
DEATH AS THE HORIZON OF THE LAW
The affinity between law and death is usually put in terms of law's pretension to finality. Taking indicative aperçus from Blanchot, this is law as 'the end', as * School of Law, Birkbeck, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, England As with so much else, this paper was generated in discussions with Adam Thurschwell and Colin Perrin. My precarious belief in it was sustained by Carrol Clarkson, Hillis Miller, and Johan van der Walt. Costas Douzinas provoked further thought on sovereignty.
antithetical to 'life itself'.
2 And in a way Blanchot would go so far as to subordinate law to death for, so he finds, law is 'less the command that has death as its sanction, than death itself wearing the face of law'; this 'death is always the horizon of the law'. 3 The thought is hardly original. When death is seen as something like a constituent limit of law, this is law in its avowal of certainty and predictability, law 'in its origin, in its very order'. 4 Yet it is revealing, and this is a point I will come to later, that the association between law and death is so often seen in terms of an ultimate or final assertion that is sovereign, either the law itself as sovereign or law as an 'instrument' of sovereignty, a giving effect to 'the right of death of the sovereign'.
5
Almost in spite of all this, death is also for Blanchot the horizon of the law in quite another way. Again, this thought does not put a great strain on originality, even if it will prove to be a more productive one. Here the horizon does not simply contain but, 'irreducible to all forms of legality through which one necessarily tries to regulate it', but which ultimately 'cannot be enounced in any already formulated language '. 12 Thence, the achingly simple point of this paper becomes that, no matter how 'necessary' this regulation, for law to be law nothing can be placed before it. Or that which is placed before it can only be nothing.
law 'exists only in regard to its transgression-infraction'. 16 In its 'ruin', its 'rottenness', borrowing now from Derrida, the realized law continually slides into this unrealizable exteriority, an exteriority which in turn must be 'cut' into for law's 'necessarily' contained existence.
17
What we have here, in sum, are two laws or two deathly horizons of the law. One is the law inseparable from the nothingness of 'its' exteriority, the law which, as Cixous Another telling example comes from the requirement that laws be 'general'.
Because of this requirement, it used often to be said that a decision confined to a particular determination does not count as law. 32 Yet the ultimate way in which law is made determinate is in the decision, and the decision will always be specific. Neither the decision nor the circumstances provoking it will ever be exactly repeatable or
repeated. Yet, if the general cannot find itself in law's determinate existence, it cannot be so general that it falls completely into nothingness and has no bearing on anything specific, no operative content at all. Hence the common and paradoxical requirement that law's 'generality must be specific'. 33 Perhaps the ur-instance of an enabling concept in law could be that of 'responsibility' and I will draw on that as a bridge back to Blanchot's concept of a responsibility which 'is' the law of the law, that responsibility or, in an archaic usage, responsability 'towards the Other' which is 'necessarily regulated' in the making of the determinate law. Revolution. Here the generality of right has become universal, 'pure abstraction' -a universality which for the citizens comes to 'negate the particular reality of their lives', which fills possibility so completely that 'in the end no one has a right to his life any longer, to his actually separate and physically distinct existence'. 36 To be a citizen in this totalized event, to be a carrier of this strange or estranged right, is to be absolutely, is to lose the materiality of one's distinct being. Totality realized allows of no being apart from itself. There remains no space for our own, our singular life.
There 'death is sovereign'. 39 With its claim to a completeness yet specificity of power, this is a sovereignty to which law has proved susceptible. Law's constituent imperative that nothing can be placed before it leaves it a vacuity. It must ever respond to and depend on an 'outside' for its contents and, in much philosophical and in even more jurisprudential thought, sovereignty has been assertively advanced as that which endows law with content.
All of which would seem to wrap things up and you, dear reader, may be almost as relieved as I to conclude at that, but there would remain the problem that the right to death imports the exact opposite. It is 'each person', 'every citizen' who 'has a right to death', and not the sovereign. 
